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rights have come to be integrated in particular PTAs.
Within each stage, the account is rich, sophisticated, and
highly readable. The book strikes a good balance: It is
strongly analytical while simultaneously readable and
empirically rich. Along the way, we are introduced to a
wide variety of actors and structures—domestic interest
groups, elected politicians, national constitutions, legisla-
tive processes, trade negotiators, and repressive govern-
ments. Hafner-Burton succeeds both inmaking complexity
parsimonious and in telling a compelling story.
One of the great strengths of the book is breadth of the
argument and, hence, of its empirical coverage. Inter-
national relations has a vogue for monocausality and for
framing puzzles in dependent variable–independent vari-
able terms, which often obscure causal richness. This book
instead embraces politics and unpacks causal process in all
their complexity. It offers an object lesson for the ways in
which scholars and graduate students can think about com-
plex puzzles that transcend domestic and international
politics. However, in attempting to cover such a range—of
questions, stages of causal process, time periods and states—
the inevitable trade-off is that at times the evidence base
can seem a little thin, and that occasionally important and
contestable empirical claims are reduced to assertions. For
example, in unpacking “preferences,” a range of “crises”—
such as Yugoslavia and Haiti in the immediate post–Cold
War aftermath—are cited as having causal importance
(p. 76), but only a narrative claim that they existed in the
background is used to substantiate causal impact. While
the macro-causal logic of the book is strong, its analysis of
micro-level processes is therefore more cursory, often rest-
ing on unsubstantiated claims about motives, interests,
and background conditions, in which we are required to
take Hafner-Burton’s word for it.
This, in turn, leaves the reader potentially skeptical about
some of the broader claims. How much are the empirics
being shoe-horned into the analytical framework? In par-
ticular, Hafner-Burton is implicitly dismissive of the role
of ideas and norms in her causal story. She acknowledges
that the force of human rights norms and hence ideas
represent an important alternative explanation. Yet, rather
than engage in an open debate with those alternative frame-
works, her approach is to co-opt them to her inherently
rationalist explanation: “[T]o be sure, the moral discourse
on human rights has evolved tremendously . . . yet it is
clear that moral norms did not find a clear path to regu-
lation” (p. 83). While rationalist scholars will be intu-
itively sympathetic to the focus on interests and institutions,
those with more constructivist proclivities will be left won-
dering whether the role of ideas and norms are underplayed.
This is a book that matters for both policy and theory;
it has potentially huge implications for the practice of
human rights and for the study of politics and inter-
national relations. Policymakers and practitioners will find
really valuable insights that enable them to better under-
stand the processes by which human rights become part
of trade agreements. In unpacking causal process, Hafner-
Burton offers insights into the levers and mechanisms for
real-world change. At the level of theory, it gives us new
ways to methodologically and analytically bridge the
domestic–international divide. It also tells us something
of potentially much wider significance about how it is
that issue linkages emerge and issue areas become inter-
twined or nested within the institutional structures of other
seemingly unrelated issue areas.
Yet in both cases, the book is strangely understated in
the claims it makes about its wider implications. Its policy
conclusions are ambivalent, telling us that “policymakers
. . . are primarily motivated by their own self-preservation
to put human rights standards into trade agreements, but
these regulations can indeed make a difference in coun-
tries guilty of abusing human rights” (p. 164); yet that the
human rights clauses work when there are “enough mean-
ingful incentives and commitment instruments” but that
they are “not the ideal form of human rights governance.”
While these conclusions are entirely consistent logically,
they present an incomplete picture of the way forward in
policy terms. What are the insights for human rights pro-
motion through trade agreements? Should they be pur-
sued or not, and, if so, how? Similarly, at the level of
theoretical implications, the book is understated, and the
conclusion shies away from engaging in bigger debates
with international relations theory or from deriving wider
conceptual implications.We are left on the final page with
the idea that politics has “changed the face of economic
statecraft” (p. 174) in unanticipated ways that have impli-
cations for human rights and the international political
economy, but we are left wondering about implications
that the book has for our conceptual understanding of the
world.
Overall, this is a highly accessible and original book
that deserves to be widely read and cited, both for the
compelling and important story it tells as for its poten-
tially wider contribution to political science and inter-
national relations. Hafner-Burton has an immense talent
for framing and analytically unpacking complex empirical
puzzles. In Forced to Be Good, she uses it to great effect to
highlight the changing nature of the politics of both trade
and human rights.
Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at
Fifty. By Giandomenico Majone. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth, $38.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003823
— Frank Schimmelfennig, ETH Zurich
In its subtitle, Giandomenico Majone’s book refers to the
fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in 2007. But
the book is not a birthday present—at least not a pleasant
one. The title is reminiscent of Europe’s Would-Be Polity by
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Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). If
their book can be seen as the refinement and adaptation
of neofunctionalist integration theory to the adolescent
problems of the European Community, Majone’s is the
pitiless diagnosis of a midlife crisis. He dismisses both the
European Union’s “crypto-federalist” method of integra-
tion and much of the scholarship that has grown around
it. Contrary to what the title suggests, the book deals only
to a very minor extent with the EU as a foreign policy
actor. It is a polemic essay. Do not expect well-balanced
and richly referenced arguments or data-based theory test-
ing. But Majone draws on much of his earlier work (above
all, Dilemmas of European Integration, 2005) and sharpens
the conclusions drawn there.
The author deciphers the “operational code” of Euro-
pean integration, depicts its unintended (and undesirable)
consequences, describes the impasse in which the EU finds
itself, and discusses solutions. According toMajone, Euro-
pean integration has followed a fewmajor operational prin-
ciples. As a response to the failure of mass-based European
federalism in the early post–World War II era, European
elites have pursued what he calls a crypto-federalist strat-
egy. They have prioritized institutional integration over all
competing values, including democracy and economic effi-
ciency. Following the “bicycle theory of integration,” which
assumes that integration cannot pause without collapsing,
they have pursued continuous movement regardless of ulti-
mate ends. Finally, they have used the “strategy of the fait
accompli” or “integration by stealth”; that is, they have
prepared and established further steps of integration in a
way that prevented open debate, accountability, and mod-
ifications. Majone attributes a pivotal role in this strategy
to the “Community method,” which accords the unelected
European Commission a formal monopoly of agenda
setting.
This elitist, technocratic, andunaccountable style of deci-
sion making focused on integration for its own sake pro-
duces inefficient policies that are neither abandoned nor
adequately reformed (such as the common agricultural and
fisheries policies), aswell as far-reaching integrationprojects
(such asmonetary union andEastern enlargement) that not
only lack democratic support but also proper attention to
risks and resources. Evenpostwar peace and economic pros-
perity in Europe only coincidedwith European integration
but were not caused by it.
Yet the biggest successes of the crypto-federalist
strategy—the introduction of the euro and big bang
enlargement—exposed its limits at the same time. For
one, they affected the people more directly than earlier
integration projects, politicized European integration,
mobilized Euro-skepticism, and triggered negative
referendums against treaty revisions in a variety of coun-
tries. In addition, enlargement increased the economic
and social heterogeneity of the EU, thereby undermining
the one big project thatMajone supports: the single market.
What is to be done about the conundrum in which the
EU finds itself ? Majone rejects all solutions that would
amount to replicating the nation-state model at the regional
level. Not only does the EU lack the normative and finan-
cial resources to sustain a Europe-wide democratic welfare
state; such a solution would also not tackle the core prob-
lem, which does not consist in a neoliberal EU (Majone
disputes this) or in its democratic deficit but in the pur-
suit of ever deeper and wider integration in the face of
economic and social heterogeneity. The Community
methodmay have been suitable for a small group of homo-
geneous and integration-friendly countries but not in the
current environment.
In its stead, Majone advocates differentiated integra-
tion. Rather than aiming at the Europe-wide and unified
centralization of all policy sectors, the EU would be a club
of clubs with different levels of centralization and mem-
bership.This would allow for a bottom-up process in which
each country could choose the levels and field of integra-
tion that its citizens desire. Each club would bring together
countries with homogeneous preferences, and competi-
tion between clubs would improve the overall results of
integration.
This is a timely book. Even though it came out a bit
too late for the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of
Rome, it was published before the euro zone debt crisis
that moved many of the issues discussed by Majone into
the spotlight. It is also a book that shows a rare combi-
nation of historical depth, broad knowledge of EU poli-
cies and institutions, familiarity with specific issues and
cases, and clear analytical focus. Given the polemical nature
of the book, the author can be forgiven for painting
European integration with too-stark contrasts and colors.
The Commission’s role as the villain of crypto-federalism
is exaggerated. It has been the greatest institutional loser
of the series of treaty reforms in the past 20 years, and
Majone’s prime examples of the EU’s hubris—monetary
union and enlargement—have mainly been the product
of intergovernmental negotiations. The “strategy of the
fait accompli” does injustice to the intense debate and
conflicts about enlargement and monetary union, not
only among the member states but also in the mass media.
There is a tendency in the book to attribute everything
that went wrong in Europe to the EU while denying it
any credit for what went well. Many claims involve diffi-
cult counterfactuals and would have benefited from com-
paring the EU to other international organizations or
nation-states. Inefficient policies, learning failures, the
underestimation of risks, and the overstretching of resources
are certainly not a monopoly of the EU. Finally, it is mis-
leading to include the bulk of EU research in the great
crypto-federalist conspiracy. The main features of the EU’s
“operational code” and policymaking, the democratic def-
icits, and the backlash against elitist integration projects
have long been uncovered and debated.
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These critical points concern style more than sub-
stance. Majone argues convincingly, first, that the tradi-
tional method of integration is confronted with severe
problems of mass support, resources, and capacity, that is,
the major ingredients of a crisis of system integration;
and, second, that the great leap forward to the pan-
European democratic welfare state is neither viable nor
realistic. His plea for differentiated integration is not only
theoretically attractive but also supported by reality. Euro-
pean integration has become ever more differentiated, pre-
cisely as a result of the flagship projects of the 1990s:
monetary union and enlargement.Whether member states,
old or new, join the euro zone has become de facto a
matter of (electoral) choice. It seems that the very excesses
of crypto-federalism Majone criticizes help bring about
the kind of European integration he favors.
More discussion is needed on the trade-offs involved in
differentiated integration. Majone describes the “old
Europe” and “new Europe” coalitions that formed on the
occasion of the war against Iraq in 2003.These were exactly
the competing clubs based on homogeneous sets of pref-
erences that match his general vision of differentiated
integration—and a guarantee for keeping the EU in the
position of a would-be world power for the next 50 years.
A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Secessionist Conflicts. By Jonathan Paquin. Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. 230p. $85.00 cloth, $27.95
paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003835
— Jason Sorens, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
In his book, Jonathan Paquin aims to explain US govern-
ment decisions to recognize and not to recognize seces-
sionist states. He justifies a focus on recognition specifically
rather than “support” more generally on the grounds that,
for the globe’s sole remaining superpower, recognizing a
state entails ongoing diplomatic ties and requires some
degree of commitment to helping the new state maintain
its independence against potential enemies. Using the
framework of “defensive positionalist realism,” Paquin
argues that the US government takes a pessimistic view of
changes in the international environment and seeks to
minimize rather than to exploit “stability gaps” in the state
system (pp. 28–29). Consequently, the US government
has maintained a generally antisecessionist stance on rec-
ognition. Nevertheless, when circumstances are such that
recognizing the seceding state is more likely to create
regional stability than withholding recognition, the US
decides to recognize the new state.
The sketch of the argument is as follows: If a central
government successfully maintains stability, whether
through repression or liberality, or makes a good-faith
effort to restore stability by negotiating with secession-
ists, the US government opposes secession. If the preced-
ing conditions do not hold, and the seceding state
demonstrates its ability to maintain external and internal
stability, then the US government recognizes the seced-
ing state; otherwise, it does not (p. 45). Alternative hypoth-
eses considered at length are that ethnic lobby strength
determines US recognition policy and that US business
interests guide State Department decision making. (Paquin
more summarily rejects several other hypotheses for which
there is readily available contrary evidence: weakening
threatening powers, supporting secessionists in weaker
states, maintaining a consistent antisecession norm, and
supporting the side with whom there is a greater “civili-
zational tie” [p. 27].)
The author tests the argument by means of controlled
case comparisons on separatist movements in the former
Yugoslavia and in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somali-
land). Fluctuations in the relative abilities of central states
and secessionist rebels to guarantee stability provide within-
case variance that he is able to exploit. Additionally, he
provides some “process tracing” evidence from declassi-
fied diplomatic cables and analyses and from interviews
with policymakers to support the argument.
The evidence largely supports the argument. Paquin
persuasively shows that the United States withheld recog-
nition from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia until April
1992 for fear that premature recognition would encour-
age interethnic violence and concomitant, destabilizing
refugee flows in the latter two countries. At the same
time, the United States chose to recognize Bosnia earlier
than did the European Union precisely to discourage a
Serbian invasion. On the other hand, the US govern-
ment waited to accord Macedonia full recognition for
fear that it would provoke tension or even conflict with
Greece. Once the United States did recognize Macedonia
(as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or
FYROM) in 1994, the powerful Greek-American lobby
was unable to persuade the US government to reverse its
decision. In 2004, the Bush administration recognized
the state under the name Republic of Macedonia against
strenuous objections from the government of Greece, in
order to reward the new government for following through
on a controversial decentralization plan intended to set-
tle an Albanian insurgency.
The case that does not fit the argument well is Somali-
land. By 2001, Somaliland had established a stable, dem-
ocratic, federal government at peace with its neighbors, a
comparative bright spot in a war-ravaged, anarchic coun-
try. Still, the United States withheld recognition, and the
evidence shows little internal debate at the State Depart-
ment on the matter. Paquin appeals to a “Somalia aver-
sion” dating to 1993’s Battle of Mogadishu as the main
reason for the US government’s lack of interest (pp. 164–
65). However, this explanation strikes me as ad hoc, and
an alternative explanation—appeasing the antisecessionist
African Union (formerly OAU, Organization of African
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